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"TEMPTATION'S PAGE FLIES OUT THE DOOR": 
NAVIGATING COMPLEX SYSTEMS OF 
DISABILITY AND THE LAW FROM A 
THERAPEUTIC JURISDICTION PERSPECTIVE 
Michael L. Perlin, Esq & Mehgan Gallagher,Esq.t 
INTRODUCTION 
Disabilities systems are complex. Legal systems are complex. When 
the two are combined, the complexity is increased exponentially. Remarka-
bly, there has been little scholarly attention paid to this important phenome-
non. In this paper, we consider some of the difficulties of navigating two 
targets that often seem to be moving in opposite directions, of addressing a 
question that, to the best of our knowledge, has never previously been ad-
dressed. Consider these preliminary thoughts. For these purposes, "the law" 
includes many different areas: criminal law and procedure (among others, 
the relationship between mental disability and the incompetency status, the 
insanity defense, sentencing, and statuses such as that of one being a persis-
tent sex offender); civil rights law (the rights of persons with disabilities to 
adequate treatment, to aftercare, to refuse the imposition of unwanted antip-
sychotic medication, and the scope of anti-discrimination law); international 
human rights law (its interrelationship with domestic law and the extent to 
which the latter needs to be modified if it conflicts with the former); bene-
fits law (social welfare, veterans' laws, more), and the relationship between 
mental disabilities and other areas of the law (family law, private civil law 
[separately, looking at tort law, contracts law, trusts and estates law], sexual 
autonomy, and others).1 
t Michael L. Perlin, Esq. is a Professor Emeritus at Law at New York Law School 
and an Adjunct Professor at the Emory University School of Law. He is the Founding 
Director of the International Mental Disability Law Reform Project, and Co-Founder of 
the Mental Disability Law and Policy Associates. Mehgan Gallagher, Esq. is a Law 
Fellow at the O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at the Georgetown 
University Law Center. Portions of this article were written during the time when one of 
the co-authors (Mr. Perlin) was an international visiting scholar at RMIT Law School, 
Melbourne, Australia, March-April 2017. An earlier draft was presented by the same 
co-author as a "master class" to the School of Social and Political Science, University 
of Melbourne, April 5, 2017. Our thanks to Professor Penny Weller for inspiring this 
piece. 
1. For an overview of most of these as they relate to mental disability, see gener-
ally MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL 
AND CRIMrNAL (3d ed. 2018). 
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For these purposes, "disability" also includes many different statuses: 
from one perspective, psychosocial disability, intellectual disability, those 
with dual diagnoses; from another, the extent and the severity of the disabil-
ity, and its impact on the person in question; from yet another, whether the 
person with a disability is in the community or an institution (or, if in the 
community, in danger of being institutionalized). 2 One example of conflict: 
antidiscrimination law can make it unlawful for an employer to refuse to 
hire someone with a disability, but many governments will only provide 
benefits (including health care and insurance) if a person proves complete 
disability, thus prohibiting him or her from working. 3 Anti-discrimination 
laws are based on social models of disability; social benefits laws often on 
the (discarded-in-international-law) medical model. 4 Virtually no attention 
has been paid to these conflicts in cases involving criminal prosecutions. 
Making this assignment even more challenging is an assumption that 
governs much of the literature about the relationship between these two 
systems: that when questions of disability are considered in the context of 
the legal system, the person at risk has counsel that is competent to re-
present her. This is the ultimate assumption of a fact-not-in-evidence; it is 
one that one of the co-authors (Mr. Perlin) has written about in many other 
contexts,5 but has never before considered in this sense. 
2. It is also necessary to consider-in the broader context-the impact of the law 
on persons who are treated or perceived as being disabled, but who, in fact, are not. See, 
e.g., Thomas N. Abbott, Kaplanand Regarded As: Does the ADA Discriminatebetween 
Real and PerceivedDisability, 39 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 883, 883 (2006). 
3. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 2 et seq., 29 
U.S.C.A. § 1001 et seq. (2012), as interpretedin Street v. Aetna Life Insurance Com-
pany, 188 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2016). 
4. See, e.g., Karen Andreasian et al., Revisiting S.C.P.A 17-A: Guardianshipfor 
People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, 18 CUNY L. REV. 287, 288 
(2015); Michael L. Perlin, "Striking for the Guardiansand Protectorsof the Mind": 
The Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilitiesand the Future of Guardian-
ship Law, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 1159, 1173 (2013). 
5. See, e.g., Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, "Farfrom the Turbulent 
Space": Consideringthe Adequacy of Counsel in the Representation of IndividualsAc-
cused of Being Sexually Violeni Predators,18 U. PA. J. L. & SOC'L CHANGE 125 
(2015) [hereinafter Cucolo & Perlin, Turbulent Space]; Heather Ellis Cucolo & 
Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Dignity and Preventing Shame and Humiliation by Im-
proving the Quality and Education of Attorneys in Sexually Violent Predator(SVP) 
Civil Commitment Cases,28 FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 291 (2017) [hereinafter Cucolo 
& Perlin, Promoting Dignity]; Alison J. Lynch & Michael L. Perlin, "Life's Hurried 
TangledRoad":A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis of Why DedicatedCounsel Must 
Be Assigned to Represent Personswith Mental Disabilitiesin Community Settings, 35 
BEHAV. SCi. & L. 353 (2017); Michael L. Perlin, "And My Best Friend,My Doctor! 
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We believe that any conclusions we come to must be filtered through 
the reality that (1) many individuals with disabilities have no counsel at all 
(for multiple legal, political, social, and cultural reasons), and (2) many of 
the lawyers who represent hese individuals do an obscenely inadequate job, 
whether the case is a civil commitment matter,
6 a death penalty sentencing,7 
or a guardianship case,8 to posit three disparate examples. By way of exam-
ples, in a recent article contrasting counsel in traditional civil commitment 
cases and in problem-solving mental health courts, Mr. Perlin characterized 
many lawyers in the traditional court setting as "bored or contemptuous [of 
their clients]."9 Stephen Bright, one of the pre-eminent death penalty law-
yers of the modem era, has said flatly that "[t]he death penalty will too 
often be punishment not for committing the worst crime, but for being as-
Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": The Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to 
Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN DIEGO L. Rev. 735, 736 (2005) [hereinafter Perlin, 
Best Friend];Michael L. Perlin, FatalAssumption: A CriticalEvaluationof the Role of 
Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1992) [hereinafter 
Perlin, FatalAssumption]; Michael L. Perlin, "I Might Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be 
Your Funeral,My Trial": A Global Perspective on the Right to Counsel in Civil Coi-
mitment Cases, andIts Implicationsfor ClinicalLegal Education, 28 WASH. U. J. L. & 
SOC'L POL'Y 241 (2008) [hereinafter Perlin, Your Funeral];Michael L. Perlin, "The 
Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden": The Role of Counsel and the Courts in 
Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin, Execu-
tioner'sFace]; Michael L. Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, "Is It More than Dodging 
Lions and Wastin' Time"? Adequacy of Counsel, Questions of Competence, and the 
Judicial Process in Individual Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 2 PSYCHOL., PUB. 
POL'Y & L. 114 (1996) [hereinafter Perlin & Dorfman, Wastin' Time]. 
6. See, e.g., Perlin, Your Funeral,supra note 5, at 241. 
7. See, e.g., Perlin, Executioner's Face, supra note 5, at 201. 
8. See, e.g., Winsor C. Schmidt, Guardianshipfor Vulnerable Adults in North Da-
kota: Recommendations Regarding Unmet Needs, Statutory Efficacy, and Cost Effec-
tiveness, 89 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 77, 77 (2013). 
9. Michael L. Perlin, "Who Will Judge ihe Many When the Game is Through?": 
Considering the Profound Differences between Mental Health Courts and "Tradi-
tional" Involuntary Civil Commitment Courts, 41 SEATYLE U. L. REV. 937, 938 (2018) 
[hereinafter Perlin, Who Will Judge]. Mr. Perlin had occasion to speak to private coun-
sel who had been assigned to represent a patient in a county in which the New Jersey 
Division of Mental Health Advocacy [which the author then directed] . . . did not re-
present patients. The assigned counsel asked [the author], "Why is the State wasting 
money to pay me to do this bullshit?" Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "Mr. Bad 
Example": Why Lawyers Need to Embrace TherapeuticJurisprudenceto Root Out San-
ism in'the Representation of Persons with Mental Disabilities,16 Wyo. L. REv. 299, 
314 n.96 (2016) [hereinafter Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example]. 
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signed the worst lawyer."' 0 Additionally, the reporters are replete with cases 
in which lawyers in guardianship cases provided pitifully inadequate coun-
sel. I" In this paper, we will attempt to "tease out" some of the main threads 
in this discourse in the following manner. 
First, we will consider the hopelessness of conceptualizing "law" as a 
single system, especially when it comes to dealing with questions of disa-
bility, using the topic of criminal incompetency as an example,' 2 and then 
looking at these questions in the specific context of international human 
rights law.' 3 Then, we will look at the futility of seeking to create a uniform 
view of a "disability" system, as that phrase has little meaningful content, 
given the range of disabilities, the range of attitudes towards persons with 
different disabilities, and the futility of trying to come up with a single 
formulation that would cover individuals in the community and those insti-
tutionalized.' 4 After this, we will consider the role of lawyers in both of 
these systems, and how the "wild card" of sanism ultimately controls the 
extent to which these two systems can ever be meaningfully navigated.1
5 
Finally, we will consider the potential impact of the school of law and pol-
icy known as "therapeutic jurisprudence," and how a turn to therapeutic 
jurisprudence might, optimally, offer us a solution.1 6 
10. Stephen B. Bright, Death by Lottery - Procedural Bar of Constitutional 
Claims in Capital Cases Due to InadequateRepresentation of Indigent Defendants, 92 
W. VA. L. REv. 679, 695 (1990). Mr. Perlin discusses many of these cases in MICHAEL 
L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE STATES 
(2013) and in Michael L. Perlin et al. "A World of Steel-Eyed Death": An Empirical 
Evaluation of the Failure of the Strickland Standardto Ensure Adequate Counsel to 
Defendants with Mental DisabilitiesFacing the Death Penalty, U. MiCH. J.L. REFORM 
(forthcoming 2019), availableat <https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 
3332730>. 
11. See, e.g., In re Lichtenstein, 652 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 1996), as discussedin 
A. Frank Johns, Three Rights Make Strong Advocacy for The Elderly in Guardianship: 
Right to Counsel, Right o Plan, and Right to Die, 45 S.D. L. REV. 492, 497-98 (2000). 
In some cases, however, in spite of patent inadequacy, guardianship findings are af-
firmed. See, e.g., In re Guardianship and Custody of Angela Marie N., 636 N.Y.S.2d 
758 (A.D. 1996) (counsel for a parent whose rights were terminated exhibited reasona-
ble competence, and the parent did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel, even 
though counsel chose not to offer evidence or delve deeper into participation by the 
parent in a treatment program and the number and quality of the parent's visits with the 
children). 
12. See infra notes 29-67 and accompanying text. 
13. See infra notes 68-97 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 98-131 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 150-54 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 156-85 and accompanying text. 
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Our title comes from Bob Dylan's masterpiece, It's Alright Ma (I'm 
Only Bleeding).17 The lyric we use-"Temptation's page flies out the 
door"-begins this remarkable verse: 
Temptation's page flies out the door 
You follow, find yourself at war 
Watch waterfalls of pity roar 
You feel to moan but unlike before 
You discover that you'd just be one more 
Person crying.
1 8 
First, consider the "war" between those who support the "empowering 
idea that people with disabilities can and should work once discriminatory 
societal barriers are removed," 19 and those who "treat people with disabili-
ties through a medical model, seeking to objectively evaluate whether their 
medical situation entitles them to governmental benefits. '20 Professor 
Michael Waterstone has explicitly referred to this as a reflection of the 
ways that "Federal laws and policies as they relate to the employment of 
people with disabilities are at war with themselves. '21 Then, think about 
how the complexity of the laws in this area-and the generally ineffective 
level of counsel made available to persons with disabilities-causes any 
reasonable on-looker to "moan." Finally, consider the "temptation" of al-
lowing ourselves to fall into the trap of believing that the systems in ques-
tion are somehow easy to maneuver. If we so succumb, we "[fly] out the 
door," and our hopes of truly navigating these contradictory systems will 
disappear. 
I. THE "LEGAL" SYSTEM 
First, when we discuss the legal system in this paper, we are not talk-
ing about one legal system; rather, we are talking about many. The parable 
about the group of blind men and the elephant-each blind man touches a 
different part of the elephant's body and then incorrectly proclaims that the 
17. Mr. Perlin has drawn on this song for a title before. See Michael L. Perlin, 
Limited in Sex, They Dare: Attitudes Toward Issues of Patient Sexuality, 26 AMER.J. 
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 25 (2005). 
18. See Bob Dylan, It's Alright, Ma (I'm Only Bleeding), BOB DYLAN, <http:// 
www.bobdylan.com/songs/its-alright-ma-im-only-bleeding/> (last visited September 
20, 2018). 
19. Michael Waterstone, Returning Veterans and DisabilityLaw, 85 NOTRE DAME 
L. REv. 1081, 1081 (2010). 
20. Id. at 1083. 
21. Id. at 1081. 
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entire elephant resembles his section 22-has been quoted in hundreds of law 
review articles and cases, and likely comes to us from a Buddhist fable. 23 It 
has been quoted by, among others, former U.S. Vice President Al Gore, 
while writing about environmental issues. 24 It has also been used to explain 
the radically different views among the American public about the O.J. 
Simpson trial.25 However, we do not believe it has ever been invoked in a 
discussion of what we are discussing here-how our views of "the legal 
system" depend on which part of the legal system we are examining, an 
especially important issue in the context of disability law. As we have 
noted, there are at least five overarching areas that need to be considered: 
the criminal law system, the civil rights law system, the international human 
rights law system, the public benefits law system, and the private law sys-
tem. Each system is complex, and each must be navigated carefully in mat-
ters involving litigants with disabilities. 
In this paper, we will address only one aspect of one of these sys-
tems. 26 In the criminal law system, we will examine the question of criminal 
competencies, a category that extends far beyond the typically focused on 
question of fitness to proceed to trial. 27 Importantly, this is not a topic gen-
erally on the research or policy agenda of persons who characterize them-
selves as "disability rights activists. '28 The authors' decision to so limit 
their focus should in no way suggest that the other systems (or the remain-
der of the criminal law system) are not important. We think these other 
systems are vitally important and that the same points we seek to make 
about this system will apply, in parallel ways, to those as well. Of course, 
none of these systems stand alone. In many important ways, they are inter-
connected, and must be looked at in the context of the other systems. 
We start with criminal law. Within this one "system," there are multi-
ple systems to navigate in the context of criminal defendants who may have 
22. See, e.g., David Zlotnick, The Buddha's Parable and Legal Rhetoric, 58 
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 957, 958 (2001). 
23. See JoHN GODFREY SAXE, THE POETICAL WORKS OF JOHN GODFREY SAXE, 
THE BLIND MEN AND THE ELEPHANT: A HUNDoo FABLE 111 (1859). 
24. Al Gore, Address at Rio Earth Summit, 59 TENN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1992). 
25. See C. Keith Wingate, The O.J. Simpson Trial: Seeing the Elephant, 6 HAS-
TINGS WOMEN'S L. J. 121, 122 (1995). 
26. The authors hope to address some of the others in subsequent papers. 
27. See, e.g., PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, §§ 13-2 to 13-2.69, 13-.108 to 13-
151; Michael L. Perlin, Beyond Dusky and Godinez: Competency Before and After 
Trial, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 297, 297-98 (2003). 
28. Mr. Perlin draws on 45+ years of experience in coming to this conclusion. 
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a psychosocial or intellectual disability.29 These systems include: the system 
of competency statuses, the system of criminal responsibility determina-
tions, the system of sentencing (and the production of mitigating evidence), 
and the system of determining whether an individual is a sexually violent 
predator. Each of these raises discrete, complex, conceptual, strategic, and 
ethical issues that must be "gotten" by practitioners and judges if adequate 
representation is to be provided to the individual at risk. 
Again, we limit ourselves here to questions of competency. The stan-
dard for competency to stand trial in the United States is, on paper, fairly 
straight forward. The question to be asked is whether the defendant has 
"sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable de-
gree of rational understanding" and whether he has a "rational as well as 
factual understanding of the proceedings against him. '30 Does this standard 
apply in the same way if the question is whether a defendant is competent 
to represent himself? The U.S. Supreme Court said "yes" to this question in 
1993,31 but backpedaled away from it in 2008.32 It still adheres to this stan-
dard in cases involving the competence of a defendant to plead guilty. 
33 
What about all the other areas of criminal competency: competency to con-
sent to a search? To confess? To testify? To be sentenced? Or to file an 
appeal ?
34 
Judicial decisions in these latter areas appear to all be the classic "n of 
1"; judges decide these cases without paying much attention to other similar 
cases that have been decided in other jurisdictions, "surpris[ingly]" failing 
"to consider carefully" other decisions in the same substantive sub-areas of 
29. We use "mental disability" to subsume both these characterizations. Of 
course, there are many defendants whose diagnoses overlap the two. 
30. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960), as supplemented in Drope 
v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1972). See generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, ch. 
13. Standards are not dissimilar in other common law jurisdictions. In Australia, by 
way of example, it is "whether an accused has sufficient mental or intellectual capacity 
to understand the proceedings and to make an adequate defense." Rex v. Pritchard, 173 
Eng. Rep. 135, 304 (1836). 
31. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 389 (1993). Mr. Perlin criticizes the Godinez 
decision sharply in Michael L. Perlin, "Dignity Was the First to Leave": Godinez v. 
Moran, Colin Ferguson,and the Trial of Mentally Disabled CriminalDefendants, 14 
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 61, 65-70 (1996). 
32. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). See generally PEPLIN & 
CUCOLO, supra note 1, § 13-2.4, 13-130 tol3-137. 
33. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 402. 
34. For a discussion of multiple areas of the criminal law to which questions of 
competency are relevant, see generally Perlin, supra note 27. 
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competency law.35 As Mr. Perlin and a colleague recently noted in an article 
about criminology, scientific discoveries, and the judicial process, "the dan-
ger in failing to recognize the precedential value of decisions from other 
jurisdictions is the creation of an inevitably divided legal system, in which a 
person in one jurisdiction has the ability to introduce evidence that another 
individual elsewhere could not." 36 A lawyer seeking to navigate this system 
must understand these realities. 
Importantly, in his dissent from the Supreme Court's decision that had 
imposed a unitary standard for competency determinations, Supreme Court 
Justice Harry Blackmun noted archly, "[a] person who is 'competent' to 
play basketball is not thereby 'competent' to play the violin. . . . Compe-
tency for one purpose does not necessarily translate to competency for an-
other purpose. ' ' 37 This prescient rejection of a "one size fits all" standard-
at least partially vindicated fifteen years later in the Edwards decision-is 
another important piece of this puzzle that lawyers must understand. 
38 
It is imperative that lawyers understand and advocate for their clients' 
needs, particularly for clients with mental disabilities. Lawyers are gener-
ally held to a standard of reasonable competence. 39 They have a duty to stay 
abreast of changes in the law and are charged with being vigorous advo-
cates for their clients. When representing a client with a mental disability or 
dealing with an involuntary civil commitment hearing, a lawyer faces 
heightened obligations in providing effective counsel. At a minimum, coun-
sel should have a "competent understanding of the legal process of involun-
tary commitments, as well as the range of alternative, less restrictive 
treatment and care options available. '40 Prior to an involuntary civil com-
35. Perlin, supra note 27, at 309-10. See also PERLIN & CucoLo, supra note 1, 
§§ 13-2.5 to 13-2.7, 13-140 to 13-149. 
36. Michael L. Perlin & Alison J.Lynch, "In the Wasteland ofYour Mind": Crim-
inology, Scientific Discoveries and the CriminalProcess, 4 VA. J. CRuM. L. 304, 353 
(2016). 
37. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 413. See also id. ("The majority's monolithic approach 
to competency is true to neither life nor the law.") 
38. See generally Michael L. Perlin, et al., "Some Things are Too Hot to Touch": 
Competency, the Right to Sexual Autonomy, and the Roles of Lawyers and Expert Wit-
nesses, 35 TOURo L. REv. 405 (2019) (discussing the relationship between Godinez and 
Edwards, and competency questions in the case of sexual autonomy decision making). 
39. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 713-14 (1984). See also Perlin, 
FatalAssumption, supra note 5, at 53-54 (characterizing the "Strickland standard as 
'sterile and perfunctory' where 'reasonably effective assistance' is objectively measured 
by the 'prevailing professional norms"'). 
40. In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 29 P.3d 485, 498 (2001); but see Matter of J.S., 
401 P. 3d 197 (Mont. 2017) (partially overruling K.G.F.). See generally PERLIN & 
CUCOLO, supra note 1, §§ 6-3.3.4, at 6-40 to 6-41 (discussing the relationship between 
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mitment hearing or trial, counsel should fully investigate and comprehend 
the client's circumstances. 41 This involves extensive work with the client to 
understand the client's needs.42 Counsel must wear two complementary 
hats, acting as both an advocate and an adversary. 
43 
Finally, we are just beginning to understand the scope of a dilemma 
that has been under the radar for far too long.44 Merely raising the incompe-
tency status is often a perilous decision. One of the most vexing ethical 
issues that criminal attorneys face is whether to raise the issue of compe-
tency, and by extension, whether to raise the issue of competency over the 
defendant's objection. 45 There are multiple reasons why an effective and 
competent defense lawyer might not raise the question of incompetency, 
among them being the subsequent lack of availability of bail, the conditions 
of institutionalization at the referral hospital, and the possible iatrogenic or 
ameliorative impact of psychiatric institutionalization on the defendant.
46 
Josephine Ross has suggested that an "ethic of care" might call for disre-
garding incompetency concerns,47 and Christopher Slobogin and Amy 
Mashburn underscore that the raise-or-not-raise decision is necessarily a 
"nuanced" one.48 In a particularly thoughtful piece, Keri Gould has de-
scribed that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel may ethically 
K.G.F.and J.S.). Notwithstanding the decision in J.S., we believe that the standards laid 
out in K.G.F. are the appropriate ones that should prevail. 
41. K.G.F., 401 P. 3d at 492. On how this is regularly not done in civil commit-
ment cases, see Perlin, Who Will Judge, supra note 9, at 939-45. 
42. K.G.F., 401 P. 3d at 498. 
43. Id. at 500. 
44. See Michael L. Perlin, "Wisdom Is Thrown into Jail": Using Therapeutic Ju-
risprudence to Remediate the Criminalizationof Personswith Mental Illness, 17 MIcH. 
ST. U. J.L. & MED. 343, 360 (2013). 
45. Michael L. Perlin & Naomi M. Weinstein, "Said I, 'But You Have No 
Choice' ": Why a Lawyer Must Ethically Honor a Client's Decision about Mental 
Health Treatment Even if It Is Not What S/he Would Have Chosen, 15 CARDOZO PUB. 
L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 73, 103 (2016-2017). 
46. PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, § 13-1.5.4, 13-59 tol3-67 (discussing the 
role of counsel in incompetency proceedings). 
47. Josephine Ross, Autonomy Versus a Client's Best Interests:The Defense Law-
yer's Dilemma When Mentally Ill Clients Seek to Control Their Defense, 35 AM. CRIM. 
L. REv. 1343, 1372-81, 1385 (1998) (discussing the relationship between therapeutic 
jurisprudence and an "ethic of care"). 
48. Christopher Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The CriminalDefense Lawyer's Fi-
duciary Duty to Clients with Mental Disability, 68 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1581, 1622 
(2000). 
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support the decision to ignore the competency question entirely.49 This is-
sue is of special importance in the case of defendants charged with petty 
offenses who face little or no jail time if convicted, but may be institutional-
ized for years in maximum security facilities once the status issue is 
raised.5 
0 
The stakes are raised here because of the reality that, when the incom-
petency status is raised in a criminal case, "many lawyers also [often] im-
pute a blanket incompetency in all aspects of life decision-making to such 
clients. '51 Thus, the late Bruce Winick and his colleagues have suggested 
that, in view of this reality and the negative psychological effects of incom-
petency labeling, criminal attorneys can help their clients interpret that legal 
label in a way that "minimizes the risk of adverse psychological conse-
quences. ' '52 This contrasts-totally-with the ways that lawyers must navi-
gate the disability law system, in which they often must assert their client's 
complete disability,53 an assertion that, inevitably, often brings with it a 
claim of incompetency. 
54 
Also, we need to consider the constellation of issues raised when the 
state seeks to involuntarily medicate an incompetent defendant in order to 
make him competent to stand trial,55 or when the state institutionalizes and 
49. Keri A. Gould, A TherapeuticJurisprudenceAnalysis of Competency Evalua-
tion Requests: The Defense Attorney's Dilemma, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 83, 91-95 
(1995). 
50. See, e.g., Bruce Winick, RestructuringCompetency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA 
L. Rev. 921, 941 (1985); Susan McMahon, Reforming Competency Restoration Stat-
utes, SSRN (Mar. 1,2018), GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstractid=3132700>. 
51. Michael L. Perlin, "Too Stubborn to Ever Be Governed by Enforced In-
sanity": Some Therapeutic JurisprudenceDilemmas in the Representationof Criminal 
Defendantsin Incompetency andInsanity Cases, 33 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 475, 479 
(2010). 
52. Id. (citing, in part, BRUCE J. WINICK, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: 
ESSAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW 63-65 (1997), as quoted in Dennis Stolle et al., Inte-
gratingPreventive Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence:A Law and Psychology Based 
Approach to Lawyering, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 15, 37 (1997)). For dialogues that an 
attorney might have with her client in such cases, see Perlin, supra note 51, at 480. 
53. See Street v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 188 F. Supp. 3d 1279 (M.D. Fla. 
2016), discussed in supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
54. Patrick W. Corrigan et al., StructuralStigma in State Legislation, 56 Psycti-
ATRIC SERV. 557, 558 (2005) (discussing the difference between "mental illness" and 
"incompetence" and how the two are often improperly equated, creating an environ-
ment that fosters discrimination and restricts rights). 
55. See generally Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, "You Might Have 
Drugs at Your Command": Reconsidering the Forced Drugging of Incompetent Pre-
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forcibly medicates a person with a disability. Contrary to popular belief, 
locking up and forcibly medicating people with mental disabilities is fre-
quently not in their best interests, nor is it in the best interest of society as a 
whole.56 A strong argument can be made that, rather than protecting the 
public, our current policies decrease safety, harming many psychiatric pa-
tients, both civil patients and those in the forensic system. 57 Rather than 
encouraging persons with mental disabilities to seek meaningful treatment 
and to promote inclusion into society, this method segregates people with 
mental disabilities, and denies individuals their right to freedom and the 
right to decline psychiatric treatment. 58 Further, this methodology ignores 
the fact that many people with mental disabilities are capable of living in 
society and of making informed decisions regarding their treatment and 
therapy. 
59 
The Supreme Court has spoken on this issue in the specific context of 
incompetency to stand trial proceedings, some fifteen years ago in Sell v. 
United States,6° a case that has spawned a "cottage industry of commentary 
on the question of whether the state can medicate an incompetent defendant 
for the purpose of making him or her competent to stand trial."' 61 However, 
we globally ignore the reality that Sell and its progeny apply only to poor 
defendants-those who cannot make bail and thus are subject to the treat-
ment decisions made by their institutional keepers. 
62 
trial Detaineesfrom the Perspectives of InternationalHuman Rights and Income Ine-
quality, 8 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 381, 385-86 (2015). 
56. James B. Gottstein, Involuntary Commitment and Forced Psychiatric Drug-
ging in the Trial Courts: Rights Violations as a Matter of Course, 25 ALASKA L. REv. 
51, 51 (2008). 
57. Id. By way of example, if the medication inhibits the defendant's capacity to 
react to the proceedings and to demonstrate "remorse or compassion," the prejudice 
suffered by the defendant can be especially acute at the sentencing stage. See Michael 
L. Perlin, "Merchants and Thieves, Hungryfor Power": ProsecutorialMisconduct and 
PassiveJudicialComplicity in Death PenaltyTrials of Defendants with Mental Disabil-
ities, 73 WASH. & LEE L. Rev. 1501, 1532 (2016) [hereinafter Perlin, Merchants] (dis-
cussing Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 144 
(1992)). 
58. See, e.g., PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, §§ 8-7.2, at 8-159 to 8-165. 
59. Mehgan Gallagher, No Means No, or Does It? A Comparative Study of the 
Right to Refuse Treatment in a PsychiatricInstitution, 44 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 137, 
146-47 (2016). 
60. Sell v. U.S. 539 U.S. 166 (2003). See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, §§ 8-
7.3.2 to 8-7.3.2.2, 8-170 to 8-182. 
61. Perlin & Schriver, supra note 55, at 382. 
62. See id. at 383 ("What happens when a wealthy person, able to make bail on 
any bailable crime, is in the community pending trial[?]"). 
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The circumstances under which persons with serious mental illnesses 
find themselves in jail are dismal. Jail staff workers often have no education 
or training in the appropriate treatment of detainees with a mental illness; 
often, they respond aggressively, thus exacerbating the symptoms exhibited 
by the detainees in question.63 Many individuals with a mental illness are 
disciplined or placed in solitary confinement rather than being afforded ade-
quate treatment. 64 Additionally, persons with mental disabilities are often 
forcibly medicated in jails and prisons.65 However, even when treatment is 
administered with good intentions, it often leaves a powerful, sometimes 
lasting effect on the patient. For example, psychotropic medications are 
known to affect the mind, intellectual functions, perception, moods, and 
emotions. 66 In short, once the incompetent defendant is jailed pending trial, 
a constellation of issues emerge that must be considered if we are to come 
to grips with the inherent policy and behavioral contradictions (premised on 
disability) that underpin this area of the law. 
These issues raise the specter of what is called the "incredible di-
lemma": what can or should be done when multiple civil, constitutional, or 
statutory rights and policies clash? 67 This dilemma highlights the underly-
ing complexities of this aspect of one branch of the legal system. It is fur-
ther exacerbated exponentially by the interplay (or, perhaps, lack of 
interplay) between this strand of law and one aspect of the international 
human rights law system, a relatively undiscussed, but extraordinarily im-
63. Id. at 396. 
64. See, e.g., Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 325, 328-29 (2006); Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Soli-
tary Confinement and Mental Illness in U.S. Prisons:A Challengefor Medical Ethics, 
38 J. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 104-05 (2010). See also Michael L. Perlin, 
"God Said to Abraham/Kill Me a Son": Why the InsanityDefense and the Incompetency 
Status Are Compatible with and Required by the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilitiesand Basic Principlesof Therapeutic Jurisprudence,54 AM. CRM. L. 
REV. 479, 507-09 (2017). 
65. See generally Henry A. Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, Legal Aspects of 
Administering Antipsychotic Medications to Jail and Prison Inmates, 36 INT'L J.L. & 
PSYCHIATRY 213 (2013) (discussing the legal standards regarding informed consent and 
forcible administration of medication in correctional institutions). 
66. V. G. LONGO, NEUROPHARMACOLOGY AND BEHAVIOR 182 (1972); Gerald L. 
Klerman, PsychotropicDrugs as Therapeutic Agents, 2 HASTINGS CTR. STUD. 81, 82 
n.1. (1974). 
67. See Michael L. Perlin, HospitalizedPatients and the Right to Sexual Interac-
tion: Beyond the Last Frontier?,20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 517, 540 (1993-
94) (discussing Peter Westen, Incredible Dilemmas: Conditioning One Constitutional 
Right on the Forfeiture of Another, 66 IOWA L. REV. 741, 742 (1981)). 
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portant topic.68 First, consider the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD).69 There is no question that the CRPD is the most revo-
lutionary international human rights document ever created that applies to 
persons with disabilities.70 It furthers the human rights approach to disabil-
ity-endorsing a social model and repudiating a purely medical model-
and recognizes the right of people with disabilities to equality in nearly 
every aspect of life.71 Although little attention has been paid to its potential 
impact on forensic patients,7 2 it is essential that we focus on these questions 
68. For an extensive discussion, see Perlin, supra note 64. See also Michael L. 
Perlin & t va Szeli, Commentary on Article 14 of the Convention on the Rights of Per-
sons with Disabilities,in COMMENTARY ON UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PER-
SONS WITH DISABILITIES 402 (Ilias Bantekas, Dimitris Anastasiou & Michael Stein eds., 
2018) [hereinafter Perlin & Szeli, Commentary]. 
69. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities art. 4.1(a), Dec. 13, 
2006, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 [hereinafter CRPD]. 
70. See Michael L. Perlin, "A Change Is Gonna Come": The Implicationsof the 
UnitedNations Convention on the Rights of Personswith Disabilitiesfor the Domestic 
Practice of Constitutional Mental Disability Law, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 483, 484 
(2009); Michael L. Perlin & tva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human Rights: Evolu-
tion and ContemporaryChallenges in MENTAL HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: VISION, 
PRAXIS, AND COURAGE 80, 85 (Michael Dudley et al., eds. 2008) [hereinafter Perlin & 
Szeli, Evolution]; Michael L. Perlin & Eva Szeli, Mental Health Law and Human 
Rights: Evolution, Challenges and the Promise of the New Convention, in UNITED NA-
TIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES: MULTIDISC1PLI-
NARY PERSPECTIVES 241 (Jukka Kumpuvuori & Martin Scheninen, eds. 2010) 
[hereinafter Perlin & Szeli, Challenges]. 
71. See, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Human Rights Treaty Drafting through the Lens of 
Mental Disability: The Proposed InternationalConvention on Protectionand Promo-
tion of the Rights and Dignity of Personswith Disabilities,41 STAN. J.INT'L. L. 181, 
191, 193, 196 (2005). On the tension between the two models, see Piers Gooding, Sup-
ported Decision-Making: A Rights-Based Disability Concept and Its Implicationsfor 
Mental Health Law, 20 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 431 (2013). 
72. See Perlin, supra note 64, at 477 ("The conditions of treatment of forensic 
patients - their institutionalization in psychiatric facilities, their confinement in such 
facilities, and their possible pathways out - has always been stunningly under-consid-
ered."). Some attention has been paid, finally, in the last several years. See, e.g., 
Michael L. Perlin & Meredith R. Schriver, "You That Hide Behind Walls:" The Rela-
tionship Between the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilitiesand the 
Convention Against Torture andthe Treatment ofInstitutionalizedForensicPatients,in 
TORTURE IN HEALTH-CARE SETTINGS: REFLECTIONS ON THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON 
TORTURE'S 2013 THEMATIC REPORT 195, 216 (2013); Piers Gooding & Tova Bennet, 
The Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Sweden and the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:Human Rights Brinksmanship or Evidence It 
Won't Work?, 21 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 141, 150-52 (2018); Maya Sabatello, Where Have 
the Rights of ForensicPatientsGone? 109 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 77, 78-79 (2015). 
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notwithstanding the fact (or perhaps because of the fact) that so little con-
sideration of the Convention's application to this population has yet ap-
peared in the literature. 
73 
The Convention firmly endorses a social model of disability and re-
conceptualizes mental health rights as disability rights-a clear and direct 
repudiation of the medical model that traditionally was part-and-parcel of 
mental disability law. 74 "The Convention. . .sketches the full range of 
human rights that apply to all human beings, all with a particular applica-
'tion to the lives of persons with disabilities. 75 It provides a framework for 
ensuring that mental health laws "fully recognize the rights of those with 
mental illnesses," 76 and mandates prescriptiverights in addition to proscrip-
73. See generally Perlin & Schriver, supra note 55, at 385-86; Michael L. Perlin, 
"Your Old Road Is! Rapidly Agin' ": InternationalHuman Rights Standardsand Their 
Impact on ForensicPsychologists, the PracticeofForensicPsychology, and the Condi-
tions of Institutionalizationof Personswith Mental Disabilities,17 WASH. U. GLOBAL 
STUD. L. REV. 79 (2018). On how the CRPD has brought mental health issues more 
forcefully into the field of human rights law than ever previously, see Perlin & Szeli, 
Evolution, supra note 70. 
74. Phil Fennell, Human Rights, Bioethics, and Mental Disorder,27 MED. & L. 
95, 106-07 (2008). See also Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 621, 649-59 (1999) (addressing the differences between the "social 
model" and the "medical model"); Michael L. Perlin, "Abandoned Love": The Impact 
of Wyatt v. Stickney on the Intersection Between InternationalHuman Rights and Do-
mestic Mental Disability Law, 35 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 121, 139 (2011). On how the 
medical model "is in direct violation" of the CRPD, see Michael L. Perlin, Promoting 
Social Change in Asia and the Pacific: The Need for a DisabilityRights Tribunal to 
Give Life to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,44 GEO. 
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 14 (2012). See also id. at 47 (discussing how a "human rights" 
model of disability offers an even "more comprehensive framework for achieving social 
justice"); Nancy J. Hirshmann, DisabilityRights, Social Rights, and Freedom, 12 J. 
INT'L POL. THEORY 42 (2016) (critiquing the social rights model for focusing on justice 
rather than freedom). See generallyPIERS GOODING, A NEW ERA FOR MENTAL HEALTH 
POLICY: SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING AND THE UN CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF 
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 47, 259-60 (2017) (discussing even "more comprehensive 
framework for achieving social justice); Jonathan Mann, Health and Human Rights: If 
Not Now, When? 2 HEALTH HUM. RTS. 113 (1997) (arguing the values and language of 
human rights are better suited to addressing public health issues than a strict medical 
model). 
75. Janet E. Lord & Michael Ashley Stein, Social Rights and the RelationalValue 
of the Rights to Participatein Sport, Recreation,andPlay, 27 B.U. INT'L L.J. 249, 256 
(2009). 
76. Bernadette McSherry, InternationalTrends in Mental Health Laws: Introduc-
tion, 26 LAW IN CONTEXT 1, 8 (2008). 
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tive rights.77 There is no question that it "has ushered in a new era of disa-
bility rights policy. 
78 
What is the relevance of this to the topic under discussion? Consider 
Article 12 of the CRPD, which mandates "[e]qual recognition before the 
law" 79 and requires that "States Parties shall take appropriate measures to 
provide access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require 
in exercising their legal capacity." 80 Next, consider Article 14, ensuring that 
persons with disabilities "on an equal basis with others ... are not deprived 
of their liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily, and that any deprivation of liberty 
is in conformity with the law, and that the existence of a disability shall in 
no case justify a deprivation of liberty. 
'81 
According to the General Comments (GCs) drafted by the U.N. Com-
mittee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, however, declarations of 
unfitness to stand trial violate these articles,8 2 as such declarations, purport-
edly, "deprive [an individual] of his or her right to due process and safe-
guards that are applicable to every [other] defendant. '83 The Committee has 
also criticized individual governments for maintaining procedures that per-
mit a defendant to be deemed "unfit" to stand trial and subsequently de-
tained.8 4 Suffice it to say, we disagree passionately: "[This] statement in the" 
77. See GOODING, supra note 74, at 62 (explaining how the CRPD combines these 
two categories of rights); Paul Harpur, Time to Be Heard: How Advocates Can Use the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilitiesto Drive Change, 45 VAL. U. L. 
REv. 1271, 1295 (2011); Michael L. Perlin, The Significance of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities- And Why It Demands the Creationof an Asian!• 
Pacific Disability Rights Tribunal,in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE KANAGAWA UNIvERSrrY 
INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL STUDmS (2014) (manuscript at 9), available at <http://pa-
pers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-_id=2512846&download=yes> ( xplaining the 
significance of both proscriptive and prescriptive rights in the CRPD context in 
specific). 
78. Harpur, supra note 77, at 1295. 
79. CRPD, supra note 69, art. 12.1. 
80. Id. art. 12.3. 
81. Id. art. 14(1)(b). See generally Perlin & Szeli, Commentary, supra note 68. 
82. U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Statement on Arti-
cle 14 of the Convention on the Rights of Personswith Disabilities(Sept. 2014), availa-
ble at <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?-NewsID=15 
183&LangID=E>. 
83. Id. 
84. See, e.g., U.N. Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Conclud-
ing Observationson the Initial Report of New Zealand 33, U.N. Doc. CRPD/C/NZL/ 
CO/I (2014). 
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GCs... is the single most wrongheaded (and potentially destructive) state-
ment uttered by any supporter of the CRPD since its initial drafting. 
'85 
Nothing in this CRPD article offers the slightest shred of support to the 
abolition of the incompetency status. First, international human rights have, 
for decades, included the right to a fair trial. 86 The trial of a person who 
cannot comprehend what is going on or who cannot cooperate with her 
counsel cannot be a fair trial. Articulation of the incompetency status in no 
way indicates factual guilt.87 But if a defendant cannot articulate to her 
lawyer what her defense is, what other witnesses might be able to shed light 
on in relation to the underlying facts, or what her relationship with the al-
leged victim was, then it is incomprehensible to think that in all but the 
rarest cases such a trial will lead to an acquittal. 
Second, the Comment does not address the critical question of what 
happens if such a person chooses to waive counsel and represent herself. 
Such self-representation at trial will not "affirm the dignity" of a defendant 
who lacks the mental capacity to conduct her defense without the assistance 
of counsel.88 The trial of an incompetent defendant mocks any definition of 
dignity; this is one of the basic tenets of the CRPD. 
Third, even assuming there is any textual support within Article 14 for 
this tortured reading, it is black-letter law that any piece of legislation must 
be read in pari materia.8 9 It is axiomatic that a statute "must, to the extent 
possible, ensure that the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." 90 
Consider again other articles of the CRPD: mandating "[r]espect for inher-
ent dignity"; 91 "[fireedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
85. Perlin, supra note 64, at 480. 
86. See Charles Chernor Jalloh, Does Living by the Sword Mean Dying by the 
Sword?, 117 PENN ST. L. REv. 707, 740 (2013). 
87. AM. BAR ASS'N, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS ON MENTAL HEALTH Ch. 7, 
Pt. IV (2015). 
88. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 
465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984)). 
89. Statutes must be "taken, read, and construed together, each enactment in refer-
ence to the other, as though they were parts of one and the same law." Peraza v. State, 
467 S.W.3d 508, 520 n.29 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (quoting Jones v. State, 396 S.W.3d 
558, 561-62 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). 
90. Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 222 (2008); see also Kevin Hem-
bree, Of Two Minds about Plain Meaning: The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the 
Word "Any" in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), 60 MERCER L. REV. 1487, 1499 n.121 (2008) 
("[A] statute should be both internally consistent and consistent with other similar stat-
utes.") (citing LINDA D. JELLUM & DAVID HRJCIK, MODERN STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION: PROBLEMS, THEORIES, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 172-73 (2006)). 
91. CRPD, supra note 69, art. 3(a). 
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ment or punishment"; 92 "[f]reedom from exploitation, violence and 
abuse"; 93 a right to protection of the "integrity of the person"; 94 and the 
retention of any provisions "more conducive to the . . . rights of persons 
with disabilities. '95 Any interpretation of Article 14 that makes it more 
likely that factually innocent individuals will be convicted and incarcerated 
and that makes it less likely that the individual's trial will be "fair" must be 
rejected. 
Beyond this, consider the "what if?" If the incompetency status were 
to be abolished, then there is no question that the number of persons with 
serious mental disabilities in prisons would increase dramatically. A recent 
exhaustive report erases any shred of doubt that persons with mental disa-
bilities are regularly brutalized and tortured in prison settings.96 Consider 
these findings by Human Rights Watch: 
Corrections officials at times needlessly and punitively deluge them 
with chemical sprays; shock them with electric stun devices; strap 
them to chairs and beds for days on end; break their jaws, noses, ribs; 
or leave them with lacerations, second degree bums, deep bruises, 
and damaged internal organs. The violence can traumatize already 
vulnerable men and women, aggravating their symptoms and making 
future mental health treatment more difficult. In some cases, includ-
ing several documented in this report, the use of force has caused or 
contributed to prisoners' deaths. 97 
In a recent article on restoration of competency practices, Professor 
Susan McMahon focuses on the status of such individuals in jail settings:,: 
"Unable to follow the strict rules and regulations of a jail environment, they 
are punished by corrections officials and targeted by fellow in-
92. Id. art. 15. 
93. Id. art. 16. 
94. Id. art. 17. 
95. Id.art. 4(4). See also John Dawson, A RealisticApproach to Assessing Mental 
Health Laws' Compliance with the UNCRPD, 40 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 70, 71 
(2015) (arguing that failure to consider a person's disability may, under some circum-
stances, be discriminatory). 
96. See generally E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A Theory of 
Sentencing and Mental Illness, 103 J. Crm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147 (2013) 
("[O]ffenders with serious mental illnesses are more likely than non-ill offenders to 
suffer physical and sexual assaults ....); E. Lea Johnston, Conditions of Confinement 
at Sentencing: The Case of Seriously DisorderedOffenders, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 625 
(2014). 
97. HUMAN RIGHrrs WATCH, CALLOUS AND CRUEL (2015), available at <https:// 
www.hrw.org/report/2015/05/12/callous-and-cruel/use-force-against-inmates-mental-
disabilities-us-jails-and>. 
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mates... [T]hey are relegated to solitary confinement and subject to abuse 
and neglect in far greater numbers than non-mentally-ill detainees. '98 
In short, when seeking to navigate the criminal justice system in the 
context of the variables on which we focus in this article, this navigation 
must be done with an eye toward the international human rights system to 
avoid the peril in which the position taken by some in the disability rights 
community would place the population in question. 
II. THE DISABILITY SYSTEM 
Consider now the questions that relate to navigation of the disability 
system. As already noted, there are also multiple disability "systems." Here, 
we focus on the incompatibility of the disability law "system" that flows 
from international human rights, and the one that flows from social benefits 
law. In many ways, these two systems are in direct opposition to each 
other, and it is essential that we see the contradictions if we are to better 
understand the "bigger picture."99 
International human rights law repudiates the medical model that has 
driven the disability system for centuries. 100 For example, the CRPD flatly 
rejects this view of the relationship between persons with disability and 
society.' 0' It "responds to traditional models, situates disability within a so-
cial model framework, and sketches the full range of human rights that ap-
ply to all human beings, all with a particular application to the lives of 
' persons with disabilities."' 02 It provides a framework for ensuring that 
98. McMahon, supra note 50, at 13. 
99. Beyond the scope of this.article is an extended consideration of how we react 
to different sorts of disabilities. We note here only that the valid and reliable research is 
clear: people with mental disabilities-historically, among the most excluded members 
of society, are subject to greater prejudice than are people with physical disabilities. 
SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL 
DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES Act 4-5 (2001); see Michael E. 
Waterstone & Michael Ashley Stein, Disabling Prejudice, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. 1351, 
1363-64 (2008). 
100. See Perlin & Schriver, supra note 55, at 385. 
101. Dhir, supra note 71, at 191. See generally Thomas F. Burke & Jeb Barnes, 
Layering, Kludgeocracy and Disability Rights: The Limited Influence of the Social 
Model in American Disability Policy, 17 SOC'L POL'Y & Soc'Y 101 (2018). 
102. Lord & Stein, supra note 75, at 256. On how the CRPD fits within a social 
framework, see H. Archibald Kaiser, CanadianMental Health Law: The Slow Process 
of Redirecting the Ship of State, 17 HEALTH L.J. 139, 164 (2009); Janet E. Lord, David 
Suozzi & Allyn L. Taylor, Lessons From the Experience of U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global 
Health Governance, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 564, 568 (2010); Ronald McCallum, The 
2018-2019] TherapeuticJurisdiction 
mental health laws "fully recognize the rights of those with mental ill-
ness." 10 3 There is no question that it has changed the conversation surround-
ing disability rights policy 4 
This repudiation of the medical model demonstrates, in Professor Ge-
rard Quinn's eloquent phrase, the way that the CRPD provides a "moral 
compass for change," reflecting a "paradigm shift" in the way that we think 
about and treat persons with disabilities." 105 There is no disputing Professor 
Penelope Weller's conclusion that it illustrates "profound shifts both in the 
conception of human rights and the implementation of human rights in pub-
lic policy domains." 
10 6 
Contrarily, if one is, say, seeking government benefits because their 
disability interferes with their ability to gain paid employment, such a per-
son must rely on the medical model to offer proof that they are unable-
either for physical or mental reasons-to work. This model "casts people 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: Some Reflec-
tions (Sydney Law Sch. Research Paper No. 10/30, 2010), <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstractid=1563883>. 
103. McSherry, supra note 76, at 8. 
104. Harpur, supra note 77, at 1295. On how international human rights courts 
and commissions have begun to use international human rights standards in cases 
brought on behalf of institutionalized persons with mental disabilities, see Michael L. 
Perlin, An Internet-basedMental Disability Law Program: Implications for Social 
Change in Nations with Developing Economies, 40 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 435, 447-48 
(2007) (discussing Congo v. Ecuador, Case 11.427, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report 
No. 12/97, OEA/Ser.L./VII.95, doc. 7 (1997)); Perlin, supra note 70, at 137 (discussing 
Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, Comm. No. 241/2001, in 11 INT'L HUM. RIGHTS 
REP. 257 (Afr. Comm'n on Human and Peoples' Rights 2003)). On considering how 
different regional courts have enforced the CRPD in general, see THE UN CONVENTION 
ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES IN PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE ANALY-
SIS OF TH-E ROLE OF COURTS (Lisa Waddington & Anna Lawson, eds. 2018); Jonathan 
Bindman et al., The Human Rights Act and Mental Health Legislation, 182 BRrr. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 91 (2003); Lance Gable et al., Mental Health and Due Process in the 
Americas: Protecting the Rights of Persons InvoluntarilyAdmitted to and Detained in 
.PsychiatricInstitutions, 18 PAN. AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 366 (2005); Alison A. Hillman, 
Human Rights and Deinstitutionalization:A Success Story in the Americas, 18 PAN. 
AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 374 (2005). 
105. Gerard Quinn, The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Personswith 
Disabilities:Towarda New InternationalPoliticsof Disability, 15 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 
33, 34, 41 (2009). See also id. at 52 (characterizing the CRPD as a "beacon for an 
international consensus on justice and disability"). 
106. Penelope Weller, Human Rights and Social Justice: The Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Quiet Revolution in InternationalLaw, 4 
PUB. SPACE: J. L. & Soc. JUST. 74, 90 (2009). 
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with disabilities as the passive recipients of public welfare or charity.' 0 7 
Indeed, many U.S. public assistance and health insurance programs have 
0 8been criticized for creating incentives for people to not return to work. 1 
There is no disputing Professor Matthew Diller's conclusion that such so-
cial welfare policies "reflect a series of uneasy compromises between com-
peting principles."' 1 9 As Professor Ani Satz has noted, "The Social Security 
Act fragments the disability experience in another significant way. Individ-
uals with disabilities must often choose between employment (and civil 
rights protections in employment) and social support."' 110 
Another important international document relevant to the human rights 
of persons with trauma-related disabilities is the WHO International Classi-
fication of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF). 111 The ICF-the 
"WHO framework for measuring health and disability at both individual 
and population levels"-was officially endorsed "as the international stan-
dard to describe and measure health and disability" by all the 191 WHO 
Member States at the Fifty-Fourth World Health Assembly in May 2001.112 
The ICF acknowledges that every individual is capable of experiencing 
at least some degree of disability throughout their lifetime, whether it be 
through a change in health or environment, 113 and that "disability is a uni-
versal human experience, sometimes permanent, sometimes transient" and 
is not restricted to a small portion of the population."l 4 Again, this interna-
tional human rights approach is radically different from the systems in place 
in many domestic jurisdictions. 
It is necessary for one of the authors (Mr. Perlin) to personalize this 
analysis and share how he has dealt with this issue in the days that he was a 
107. Waterstone, supra note 19, at 1087. 
108. Id. at 1089 (citing, inter alia, Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Futureof Disability 
Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 32 (2004)). 
109. Matthew Diller, Entitlement andExclusion: The Role ofDisabilityin the So-
cial Welfare System, 44 UCLA L. REv. 361, 361 (1996). The ways in which laws such 
as the Americans with Disabilities Act have been conceived of as "welfare reform" 
rather than as civil rights are critiqued in Hirschmann, supra note 74. 
110. Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentationin Disabilityand Health Law, 60 
EMORY L.J. 277, 298 (2010). 
111. We consider the significance of the ICF in Mehgan Gallagher & Michael L. 
Perlin, "The Pain I Rise Above": How InternationalHuman Rights Can Best Realize 
the Needs of Personswith Trauma-RelatedMental Disabilities,29 FLA. J. INT'L L 271, 
288-89 (2018). 
112. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF FUNC-
TIONING, DISABILITY AND HEALTH (ICF), availableat <http://www.-who.int/classifica-
tions/icf/en/> (visited April 24, 2018). 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
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legal practitioner in two very different ways. First, when Mr. Perlin was in 
practice in his position as director of the Division of Mental Health Advo-
cacy in the New Jersey Department of the Public Advocate,' 1 5 he litigated a 
class action/law reform suit, Schindenwolf v. Klein,"16 arguing that, if pa-
tients at state psychiatric hospitals were to do work for which the state re-
ceived a consequential economic benefit, they needed to be paid in 
conformity with the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act and prevailing case 
law." 7 This was hotly contested by state defendants, but Mr. Perlin wound 
up prevailing. The Court signed an order, concluding that, "The resumption, 
continuation and strengthening of voluntary, compensated work programs 
and participation in vocational rehabilitation services may enhance re-
sidents' sense of self-motivation, self-esteem and usefulness, may diminish 
boredom and lessen states of dependency and withdrawal, and may protect 
against exploitation and allow residents to view themselves as worth-
while."" 8 The Court ordered that the state defendant, the Department of 
Human Services, was to involve no less than 25 percent of all state hospital 
residents in employment and vocational rehabilitation services.1 9 
Some years later, when he became a professor, Mr. Perlin directed the 
Federal Litigation Clinic at New York Law School. 120 In this role, he super-
vised students who represented persons with physical and mental disabili-
ties on appeals from decisions by federal Administrative Law Judges in the 
Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, who had rejected their appli-
115. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Mental PatientAdvocacy by a PatientAdvocate, 
54 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 169, 169 (1982). 
116. Schindenwolf v. Klein, No. L41293-75 P.W. (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
1975), reprinted in PIrLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, at § 19-5 (granting patients the 
right to participate in voluntary, therapeutic, compensated work programs as an aspect 
of the right to treatment). 
117. See Michael L. Perlin, The Right to Participatein Voluntary, Therapeutic, 
Compensated Work Programsas Partof the Right to Treatment: A New Theory in the 
Aftermath of Souder, 7 SETON HALL L. REv. 298,298-99 (1976). In Souder v. Brennan, 
the court had held that patient-workers at public psychiatric hospitals were "employees" 
within coverage of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, notwithstanding the claim that 
the work in question was therapeutic. See Souder v. Brennan, 367 F. Supp. 808, 811-15 
(D.D.C. 1973). 
118. PERmiN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, § 19-5, at 19-31. 
119. Id. at 19-32. Of note: Mr. Perlin was accused by some other patients' rights 
lawyers of "supporting slavery" for representing his clients in this case. Mr. Perlin re-
sponded that he was representing the views of his (presumptively competent) clients, 
which is what any ethical lawyer must do. See Perlin & Weinstein, supranote 45, at 94-
99. 
120. See Michael L. Perlin, Stepping Outside the Box: Viewing Your Client in a 
Whole New Light, 37 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 65, 67 (2000). 
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cations for SSI and SSDI benefits. To adequately represent their clients, the 
student attorneys needed to demonstrate that their clients were sufficiently 
disabled so as to qualify for benefits.' 2' To do so, they sought to amass 
expert evidence that would attest to the extent of their disability. In other 
words, to satisfy federal administrative and statutory law, they needed to 
show that their clients were fully medically disabled. 
22 
This predated both the CRPD and the Principles for the Protection of 
Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental Health Care 
of 1991 (MI Principles), the forerunner "soft law" document of the United 
Nations, 123 and truthfully, no one thought of international human rights law 
at this time' 24 in this context.125 Indeed, it would have been impossible for 
121. See Arne H. Eide et al., Participation,in HEALTH AND WELFARE SERVICES: 
PROFESSIONAL CONCEPTS AND LIVED EXPERIENCE 146 (2017) ("the medical provider 
holds the key to eligibility for disability benefits"). 
122. For representative cases, see Hill v. Sullivan, 125 F.R.D. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989); Tirado v. Bowen, 705 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Baran v. Bowen, 710 F. 
Supp. 53 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Rodriguez v. Heckler, 621 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
See also Samuel Bagenstos, Disability, Universalism,Social Rights, and Citizenship, 39 
CARDOZO L. REV. 413, 430 (2017) (explaining that "disability rights advocates cannot 
abandon disability-based benefits"); Burke & Barnes, supra note 101, at 101 (noting 
that such benefits programs "reflect a medical model of disability that is at odds with 
the social model"). 
123. Principlesfor the Protectionof Personswith MentalIllness and the Improve-
ment of Mental Health Care, G.A. Res. 119, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Supp. No. 49 
Annex, at 188-92, U.N. Doc. A/46/49 (1991). 
124. Mr. Perlin directed this Clinic from 1984-90. The first literature on this topic 
did not appear in the law review literature until 1993. See generallyEric Rosenthal & 
Leonard Rubenstein, InternationalHuman Rights Advocacy Under the "Principlesfor 
the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness," 16 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 257 
(1993). 
125. The MIl Principles have subsequently been criticized as not being sufficiently 
protective of the rights of persons with psychosocial disabilities, especially in the con-
text of the right to refuse treatment. See Tina Minkowitz, The UnitedNations Conven-
tion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to be Free from 
Nonconsensual PsychiatricInterventions, 34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 405, 407 
(2007); T.W. Harding, Human Rights Law in the Field of Mental Health: A Critical 
Review, 101 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 24, 24 (2000) (calling them "basically 
flawed"). Nevertheless, there is no question that -prior to the ratification of the CRPD 
- they became the "centerpiece of the human rights based approach to mental health 
care" in common law nations such as Australia. See Neil Rees, InternationalHuman 
Rights Obligations and Mental Health Tribunals, 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 33 
(2003); see also Terry Carney, Mental Health in Postmodern Society: Time for New 
Paradigms?10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 12 (2003); Michael L. Perlin & Naomi 
Weinstein, "There's Voices in the Night Trying to be Heard":The PotentialImpact of 
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them to have provided adequate representation to their clients had they not, 
for these purposes, "bought into" the medical model. 
126 
But we believe it is impossible for lawyers to provide adequate and 
effective representation to persons with disabilities without embracing the 
social model. Since, to the best of our knowledge, there has been almost no 
consideration of the impact of the social model on benefits law, it is neces-
sary that practitioners and scholars start taking seriously the way these sys-
tems conflict. One example of this conflict is the "tension between the 
obligation to work and the desire to aid those in need."'127 According to 
Professor Diller: 
History demonstrates that programs that seek to cast a broad net by 
relying on inclusive definitions of disability aid more individuals but 
are less likely to provide a package of benefits that is markedly supe-
rior to those offered to the poor generally. On the other hand, pro-
grams that emphasize exclusion by relying on narrow definitions of 
disability aid fewer people but are more likely to provide benefits on 
dignified and non-punitive terms. This dynamic does not stem sim-
ply from the economic equation that, absent lower benefits, broader 
programs are costlier. Rather, inclusive definitions of disability high-
light the fact that disability is not easily separable from other putative
"causes" of chronic unemployment. Narrow definitions obscure this 
difficulty by presenting disability as a status that is medically given, 
rather than socially constructed. 
128 
The medical model of disability looks at disability as a "problem" that 
belongs to the disabled individual, forcing the individual to make accom-
modations in order to adapt to the environment. 129 The medical model. 
30 views disability as something that needs to be corrected. 1 Alternatively, 
the social model (the view to which the authors adhere) looks at disability 
the Convention on the Rights of Personswith Disabilitieson Domestic Mental Disabil-
ity Law," BROOK. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
126. On how the medical model itself contributes to the disabling of individuals, 
see Emma Gieben-Gamal & S6nia Matos, Design and Disability.Developing New Op-
portunitiesfor the Design Curriculum,20 DESIGN J. § 2022 (Supp. 1, 2017). 
127. Diller, supra note 109, at 363-64. 
128. Id. 
129. Sara Goering, Rethinking Disability: The Social Model of Disability and 
ChronicDisease,8 CURR. REV. MUSCULOSKELETAL MED. 134, 134 (2015) (citing Anita 
Silvers, A Fatal Attraction to Normalizing, in ENHANCING HUMAN TRAITS 95 (Erik 
Pares ed., 1998)). 
130. Pamela Fisher & Dan Goodley, The Linear Medical Model of Disability: 
Mothers of DisabledBabies Resist with Counter-Narratives,29 SOCIOLOGY HEALTH & 
ILLNESS 66, 66 (2007). 
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as something affecting society as a whole, and puts the burden on society-
rather than the individual-to adapt.'3' The medical model sounds in pa-
thology;13 2 it views a person in a wheelchair as the problem, while the social 
model views the stairs obstructing wheelchair access to a building as the 
problem that society is responsible for fixing. 133 
It is imperative that lawyers take a holistic approach to representing all 
clients-but particularly those with mental disabilities. Counsel must recog-
nize that there is no "one size fits all" approach to disability; thus, each 
client should be treated on an individual basis, identifying their needs, 
wants, and circumstances to provide effective representation that is in line 
with the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence and human rights discussed 
throughout this article.1
34 
JIl. COMPETENCY OF COUNSEL 
This leads us to re-direct our inquiry to focus on what lawyers do, and 
what they should do, in navigating these complex systems. When we under-
take this investigation, several realities jump out at us: 
131. Arlene Kanter, The Law: What's DisabilityStudies Got to Do with It, or An 
Introduction to Disability Law Studies, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 420-21 
(2011); see also Arlene Kanter & Yotam Tolub, The Fightfor Personhood,Legal Ca-
pacity, and Equal Recognition under Law for People with Disabilitiesin Israel and 
Beyond, 39 CARDOZO L. REv. 557, 559 (2017) ("[The CRPD] changes the focus of 
legal capacity decisions from a medical model of disability, that addresses the deficit of 
the individual and emphasizes protection, to a social model of disability, that honors the 
dignity of the individual and his or her right to exercise legal capacity on an equal basis 
with others, and with support, if needed."). 
132. See Piers Gooding et al., Unfitness to Stand Trial and the Indefinite Deten-
tion of Persons with Cognitive Disabilitiesin Australia: Human Rights Challengesand 
Proposalsfor Change, 40 MELB. U. L. REV. 816, 830 (2017); see also Megan Brooks, 
How the World's Best EducationSystems FallShort: Implementing Inclusive Education 
under the CRPD in High Performing PISA Countries, 45 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & 
COM. 1, 4 (2017) ("The medical model of disability views an individual's disability 
diagnosis and uses a treatment method to 'fix' the person and push them to conform to 
society's norms."). 
133. UNIv. OF LEICESTER, THn SOCIAL AND MEDICAL MODEL OF DISABILITY, 
available at <https://www2.1e.ac.uk/offices/accessability/staff/accessabilitytutors/infor-
mation-for-accessability-tutors/the-social-and-medical-model-of-disability> (visited 
Apr. 22, 2018). 
134. See generallyPerlin & Weinstein, supra note 45. Examples of a lawyer using 
the social model to represent a client include using larger fonts in preparing documents 
for a client with a visual impairment or making an easy to read pamphlet explaining a 
law or motion for a client with an intellectual disability. 
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1) Counsel assigned to persons with disabilities has historically been 
135cases.inadequate, in both civil and criminal 
2) In some jurisdictions, there is no counsel available at all for this 
36
population. 1 
3) It is essential that here be a "wake up" call for lawyers so that it 
will be more likely that authentic representation be provided, some-
thing that can best be done through dedicated offices of well-
trained trained stand-alone lawyers. 
4) We must confront the pervasive stench of sanism that totally con-
taminates the entire legal process in cases involving persons with 
disabilities. 
We cannot overestimate the impact of these realities on all the ques-
tions we have raised here. 
First, there is no question as to the inadequacy of counsel assigned to 
represent persons with disabilities in most jurisdictions.1 37 Nearly a decade 
ago, Mr. Perlin concluded "if there has been any constant in modern mental 
disability law in its thirty-five-year history, it is the near-universal reality 
that counsel assigned to represent individuals at involuntary civil commit-
ment cases is likely to be ineffective." 138 Over twenty years ago, Mr. Perlin 
pointed out that a Presidential Commission on Mental Health noted the fre-
quently substandard level of representation made available to mentally dis-
abled criminal defendants, adding, "Nothing that has happened in the past 
two decades has been a palliative for this problem."' 39 In many jurisdic-' 
tions, such counsel is "woefully inadequate-disinterested, uninformed, 
135. For a recent analysis of the abject lack of adequacy of counsel in death pen-
alty cases involving defendants with mental disabilities, see Perlin et al., supranote 10. 
136. Many are startled to learn that in some U.S. jurisdictions, there is no absolute 
right to counsel in cases that may result in "sexually violent predators" being incarcer-
ated in prison-like maximum security facilities for life. See, e.g., Cucolo & Perlin, Tur-
bulentSpace, supranote 5, at 132 (citing, inter alia,Ramsey v. Runion, No. 2:1 lcv396, 
2012 WL 3883378, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 5, 2012) (stating "there is no federally cogni-
zable right to effective assistance of counsel in a civil commitment proceeding")). 
137. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promisesof Paradise":Will Olmstead v. 
L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional Least Restrictive Alternative Principle in Mental 
Disability Law? 37 HOUSTON L. Ruv. 999 (2000); Perlin & Dorfman, Wastin' Time, 
supra note 5, at 117. 
138. Perlin, Your Funeral, supra note 5, at 241. This, of course, presumes that 
counsel is available to represent these individuals. See, e.g., Lynch & Perlin, supra note 
5, at 355-57. Professor Heather Campbell has reminded us that in Canada, such repre-
sentation is not mandatory in all provinces. Personal communication from Professor 
Heather Campbell to author (Oct. 15, 2016) (on file with author). 
139. Perlin, Executioner's Face, supra note 5, at 207-08. 
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roleless, and often hostile."' 40 This is nothing new; we knew this at the 
dawn of the modem era of mental health law, 14' and we know it today. 142 
Second, perilously few jurisdictions have chosen to follow the exam-
ples of New York, New Jersey, and a handful of other American states that 
legislatively created regularized, dedicated, and specialized legal services 
offices whose primary job is to provide representation to persons with 
mental disabilities at involuntary civil commitment hearings. 43 Even today, 
in the highly-charged area of sexual predator civil commitment law,' 4 
many states in the U.S. make no provision for counsel, basing their inaction 
on the (false) premise that these are civil and not criminal cases. 45 The 
right to counsel at each stage in the commitment process is not automati-
cally granted and has been denied during pre-commitment evaluations, as 
well as during the psychological evaluation for the annual review hear-
ing. 146 We were stunned to read in Australian legal aid lawyer Eleanore 
Fritze's recent brilliant monograph that only a minority of Australian citi-
zens are granted a right to counsel when they appear before the Mental 
48 Health Review Tribunal in that nation.1 47 This is utterly unacceptable. 
140. Perlin, Best Friend, supra note 5, at 738. 
141. Perlin, Your Funeral,supra note 5, at 241. 
142. Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example, supra note 9, at 299-300 (discussing
"paralytic rolelessness" of counsel); see generally Perlin, supra note 9. 
143. Perlin, Your Funeral,supra note 5, at 242; see generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, 
supra note 1, §§ 6-4.2, at 6-41 to 6-48. 
144. See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
145. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 351 (1997). Mr. Perlin has 
critiqued this decision. See MICHAEL L. PERLIN & HEATHER ELLIS CUCOLO, SHAMING 
THE CONSTITUTION: THE DETRIMENTAL RESULTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENT PREDATOR LEGIS-
LATION (2017); see generally Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success like Failure/and 
Failure's No Success at All": Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 
Nw. U. L. REV. 1247 (1998). 
146. Cucolo & Perlin, Promoting Dignity, supra note 5, at 303; Greenfield v. N.J. 
Dep't of Corr., 888 A.2d 507, 511 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (holding that a sex 
offender had no due process right to review materials or meet with a committee ad-
dressing his possible referral to the state's attorney general for commitment as a sexu-
ally violent predator). 
147. ELEANORE FRITZE, SHINING A LIGHT BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: REPORT OF THE 
JACK BROCKHOFF FOUNDATION CHURCHILL FELLOWSHIP TO BETTER PROTECT THE 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, DETAINED IN CLOSED EN-
VIRONMENTS FOR COMPULSORY TREATMENT, THROUGH THE USE OF LEGAL SERVICES 
31-32 (2015). 
148. Fleur Beaupert & Eleanore Fritze, Ensuring Meaningful Participation in Fair 
Mental Health Tribunal Hearings: The Critical Role of Legal Representatives (paper 
presented at the Second International Conference on Non-Adversarial Justice, spon-
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Third, we must acknowledge that, without a cadre of trained, dedi-
cated, advocacy-focused counsel, it is impossible to aspire to any meaning-
ful level of ameliorative change in this area. Only the appointment and 
continued presence of such lawyers can make it possible for meaningful law 
reform in all aspects of commitment and institutional rights law to take 
place. 149 Without the assignment of such counsel, meaningful and amelio-
rative change is almost impossible to achieve. 
150 
Fourth, it is impossible to understand why this happens the way it does 
without understanding the significance of what we call "sanism." We be-
lieve it is impossible to understand anything we are discussing today with-
out an understanding of this invidious "ism." Sanism infects both our 
jurisprudence and our lawyering practices; it is largely invisible and largely 
socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon stereotype, myth, super-
stition, and deindividualization, and reflects the assumptions that are made 
by the legal system about persons with mental disabilities-who they are, 
how they got that way, what makes them different, what there is about them 
that lets society treat them differently, and whether their condition is immu-
table. These assumptions-those that reflect societal fears and apprehen-
sions about mental disability, persons with mental disabilities, and the 
possibility that any individual may become mentally disabled-ignore the 
most important question of all: why do we feel the way we do about "these 
people" (quotation marks understood)? 151 We can make no headway what-
soever in understanding why the navigation of the systems we have dis-
cussed is so difficult unless we come to grips with sanism.
1 52 
sored by the Australasian Institute of Judicial Administration (Sydney, SW, Australia, 
April 8, 2017)). 
149. Perlin, supra note 70, at 496. See generally Perlin, Your Funeral,supranote 
3. 
150. Michael L. Perlin, Online Distance Legal Education as an Agent of Social 
Change, 24 PAC. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEv. L.J. 95, 104 (2011). 
151. See Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting 
Rain": Consideringthe Sexual Autonomy Rights ofPersons InstitutionalizedBecause of 
Mental Disabilityin ForensicHospitalsand in Asia, 83 WASH. L. REV. 481, 486 (2008) 
[hereinafter Perlin, Expecting Rain]; Michael L. Perlin, "My Sense of Humanity Has 
Gone Down the Drain": Stereotypes, Stigma and Sanism, in STEREOTYPING AS A 
HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUE 95 (Alexandra Timmer & Eva Brems eds. 2015); Michael L. 
Perlin, On Sanism, 46 SMU L. REV. 373, 373-77 (1992); Perlin & Lynch, "Mr. Bad 
Example," supra note 9; Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 125. See generally Michael L. 
Perlin, "Infinity Goes up on Trial": Sanism, Pretextuality, and the Representation of 
Defendants with Mental Disabilities,16 QUT L. REV. 106 (2016). 
152. See Perlin & Lynch, supranote 9, at 300 (sanism "makes negative case out-
.comes nearly inevitable"). 
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Failure on the part of counsel to embrace representation of this popula-
tion is, we believe, a direct outgrowth of sanism. 153 Nearly three decades 
ago, one of the leading civil rights lawyers in this area of the law noted, 
regretfully, how "few have been willing to enter the courtroom on behalf of 
persons labeled as mentally ill or mentally retarded or to speak to a jury 
about the injuries imposed on these vulnerable citizens." 154 This lack of 
counsel, he added, contributed to "their continued legal invisibility." 155 It is 





One of the most important legal theoretical developments of the past 
three decades has been the creation and dynamic growth of therapeutic ju-
risprudence (TJ).1 58 Therapeutic jurisprudence presents a new model for as-
sessing the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a 
153. See Elayne Greenberg, Overcoming Our Global Disability in the Workforce: 
Mediating the Dream, 86 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 579, 593 (2012) ("The dynamics of san-
ism and pretextuality are a toxic combination that potentially weakens any enforcement 
opportunities of the CRPD."). "Pretextuality" means that courts regularly accept (either 
implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty, countenance liberty deprivations in dis-
ingenuous ways that bear little or no relationship to case law or to statutes and engage 
similarly in dishonest (and frequently meretricious) decision making, specifically where 
witnesses, especially expert witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort 
their testimony in order to achieve desired ends." PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, § 2-
3 at 2-10 (citing, in part, Michael L. Perlin, Morality and Pretextuality, Psychiatryand 
Law: Of "OrdinaryCommon Sense, " HeuristicReasoning, and Cognitive Dissonance, 
19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131, 133 (1991)). 
154. Steven J. Schwartz, DamageActions as a Strategyfor Enhancing the Quality 
of Care Of Personswith Mental Disabilities,17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 651, 
661 (1989-90). 
155. Id. at 663. 
156. On how our disability benefits system stigmatizes persons with disabilities, 
see Samuel Bagenstos, Disability, Universalism, Social Rights, and Citizenship, 39 
CARDOZO L. REV. 413, 435 (2017). 
157. This section is generally adapted from Michael L. Perlin & Alison J.Lynch, 
"All His Sexless Patients":Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Competence to 
Have Sex, 89 WASH. L. REV. 257 (2014); Perlin & Lynch, supra note 36; Perlin & 
Weinstein, supra note 45. Further, it distills Mr Perlin's work over the past 25-plus 
years, beginning with Michael L. Perlin, What Is Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 10 
N.Y.L. ScH. J.HUM. RTS. 623 (1993). 
158. See, e.g., BRUCE J. WNICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRU-
DENCE MODEL (2005); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK, LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC 
KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1996); DAVID B. WEX-
LER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990). Wex-
ler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental Health 
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therapeutic agent, the law can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic 
59 
consequences. 1 
TJ asks whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should 
be reshaped to enhance their therapeutic potential while not subordinating 
due process principles. 60 David Wexler clearly identifies how the inherent 
tension in this inquiry must be resolved: "the law's use of mental health 
information to improve therapeutic functioning [cannot] impinge upon jus-
tice concerns." 16 1 As Mr. Perlin has written elsewhere, "An inquiry into 
therapeutic outcomes does not mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil 
rights and civil liberties." 
162 
Using TJ, we "look at law as it actually impacts people's lives" 163 and 
assess law's influence on emotional life and psychological well-being.' 
64 
One governing TJ principle is that "law should value psychological health, 
should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever 
possible, and when consistent with other values served by law should at-
in 1987. See David B. Wexler, PuttingMental Health into Mental Health Law: Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 32-33 (1992). 
159. See Michael L. Perlin, "His BrainHas Been Mismanaged with GreatSkill": 
How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 
AKRON L. REV. 885, 912 (2009); see also Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, Mental 
Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence,in DISPUTES AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH 
LAW 91 (Ian Freckelton & Kate Peterson eds. 2006) (writing from a transnational 
perspective). 
160. Perlin, Expecting Rain, supra note 151, at 510 n.139; Perlin, Best Friend, 
supra note 5, at 751. See also Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic JurisprudenceMisunder-
stood and Misrepresented:The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
575, 585-86 (2008). 
161. David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Changing Concepts of Le-
gal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 17, 21 (1993). See also David B. Wexler, Apply-
ing the Law Therapeutically,5 APPL. & PREVENT. PSYCHOL. 179 (1996). 
162. Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REv. 407, 412 (2000); 
Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on the Borderline":Mental Disability 
Law, Theory and Practice, Us and Them, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998). 
163. Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives on 
Dealing with Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009). 
164. David B. Wexler, PracticingTherapeuticJurisprudence:PsychologicalSoft 
Spots and Strategies,in DANIEL P. STOLLE ET AL., PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRU-
DENCE: LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (2006). 
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tempt to bring about healing and wellness."165 TJ supports an ethic of 
care. 166 
Professor Amy Ronner has argued persuasively that one of the essen-
tial values of therapeutic jurisprudence is adherence to what she character-
izes as the "three Vs": voice, validation, and voluntariness. 167 Professor 
Ronner concludes: 
What "the three Vs" commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a 
sense of voice or a chance to tell their story to a decision maker. If 
that litigant feels that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard, 
and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant feels a sense of 
validation. When litigants emerge from a legal proceeding with a 
sense of voice and validation, they are more at peace with the
1 68 outcome. 
One of the central principles of TJ is a commitment to dignity, 69 a 
value that must permeate the justice system. With his colleagues Keri 
Gould and Deborah Dorfman, Mr. Perlin has concluded that "[tihe percep-
tion of receiving a fair hearing is therapeutic because it contributes to the 
individual's sense of dignity and conveys that he or she is being taken seri-
ously. ' 170 In a recent article about dignity and the civil commitment pro-
cess, Professors Jonathan Simon and Stephen Rosenbaum embrace 
therapeutic jurisprudence as a modality of analysis, and focus specifically 
on this issue of voice. "When procedures give people an opportunity to 
exercise voice, their words are given respect, decisions are explained to 
them their views taken into account, and they substantively feel less coer-
165. Bruce Winick, A TherapeuticJurisprudenceModel for Civil Commitment, in 
INVOLUNTARY DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PER-
SPECrIVE ON CiVL CoMmrTMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton, eds. 2003). 
166. See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of TherapeuticJuris-
prudence in Law School ClinicalEducation:Transforming the CriminalLaw Clinic, 13 
CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-07 (2006). 
167. Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education 
and Therapeutic Jurisprudenceas Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24 TOURO L. REv. 
601, 627 (2008). 
168. Id. 
169. See BRUCE J. WNICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE 
MODEL 161 (2005). 
170. Michael L. Perlin, Keri K. Gould & Deborah A. Dorfman, TherapeuticJuris-
prudenceand the Civil Rights of InstitutionalizedMentally DisabledPersons:Hopeless 
Oxymoron or Path to Redemption?, 1 PSYCH. PUB. POL'Y & L. 80, 114 (1995) (empha-
sis added). 
2018-2019] TherapeuticJurisdiction 
cion."171 With his colleague Naomi Weinstein, Mr. Perlin has recently ar-
gued that "attorneys must embrace the principles and tenets of therapeutic 
jurisprudence as a means of best ensuring the dignity of their clients and of 
maximizing the likelihood that voice, validation and voluntariness 172 will be 
173
enhanced." 
Professor Ronner and Judge Juan Ramirez recognize the right to effec-
tive counsel as "the core of therapeutic jurisprudence."1 74 The attorney is an 
essential part of the legal context, especially in a criminal proceeding. She 
assists individuals in articulating their wishes and telling their stories, aids 
in effectuating individuals' participatory interests, giving them voice and 
validation. 175 The question to be posed here is whether the complex systems 
we discuss in this paper-the systems of law and disability-can ever be 
meaningfully and effectively navigated if these principles of therapeutic ju-
risprudence are ignored. We believe the answer is simply "no." 
First, if we look at "the law" as a unitary construct, we ignore the 
significant differences between the various areas of law that must be ana-
lyzed separately. Criminal law, by way of example, involves the state as a 
party in all proceedings, sees punishment of offenders as one of its goals, 
and-in the U.S., at least-is limited by a series of constitutional decisions 
involving such issues as the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to 
confront witnesses, and a burden of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
that are absent from most areas of civil law. We believe that the need to 
adhere to Professor Ronner's "three Vs" is enhanced in the criminal justice 
171. Jonathan Simon & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Dignifying Madness: Rethinking 
Commitment Law in an Age of Mass Incarceration,70 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1, 51 (2015). 
172. See Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participa-
tion: TherapeuticJurisprudence,Mirandaand Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 89, 94-95 
(2002). Ironically, and importantly, a "voluntary" status in mental health commitment is 
not always truly voluntary. On the ways that hospital staff can routinely manipulate 
such disparity in bargaining to coerce patients into accepting voluntary commitment 
status (thus avoiding court hearings), see Susan A. Reed & Dan A. Lewis, The Negotia-
tion of Voluntary Admission in Chicago'sState Mental Hospitals, 18 J. PSYCHIATRY & 
L. 137 (1990); see also Joel Haycock, Mediating the Gap: Thinking About Alternatives 
to the CurrentPracticeof Civil Commitment, 20 ]NEw ENG. J.CRIM. & CrV. CONFINE-
MENT 265, 278 (1994) ("[The patient's lawyers], in collusion with the care-givers, dis-
empower him or her and effectively thwart the establishment of a voluntary treatment 
compact between the patient and mental health professionals."). 
173. Perlin & Weinstein, supra note 45, at 115. 
174. Juan Ramirez, Jr. & Amy D. Ronner, Voiceless Billy Budd: Melville's Trib-
ute to the Sixth Amendment, 41 CAL. W. L. REv. 103, 119 (2004). 
175. See Amy D. Ronner & Bruce J.Winick, Silencing the Appellant's Voice: The 
Anti-therapeuticPerCuriamAffirmance, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 499, 503-4 (2000); see 
generally Perlin & Dorfman, Wastin' Time, supra note 5. 
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system because of the stigma of a criminal conviction and the possibility 
that a defendant found guilty might lose his liberty. Here, especially, if liti-
gants do not "have a chance to tell their story to a decision maker," 17 6 then 
therapeutic jurisprudence cannot be present. 
Although there was originally significant scholarly interest in the rela-
tionship between TJ and competency to stand trial, 177 that interest has 
mostly abated in recent years.17 8 TJ was introduced in the early 1990s by 
Professors David Wexler and Bruce J. Winick. 179 It was first applied in drug 
treatment courts in 1999,180 then extended to domestic violence courts, 
mental health courts, re-entry courts, and community courts. 181 It has spread 
across all areas of law, including criminal law, family law, health law, torts 
law, contracts and commercial law, and trusts and estates.1 8 2 It became a 
critical centerpiece of analysis of mental health law generally. 
183 
A recent article underscores that "the implications of expanding the 
scope of the forensic evaluator's role to include therapeutic jurisprudence 
objectives more explicitly would require further exploration and discussion 
176. Ronner, supranote 167, at 627-28. See also, e.g., Evelyn H. Cruz, Validation 
Through Other Means: How Immigration Clinics Can Give Immigrants a Voice When 
BureaucracyHas Left Them Speechless, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 811, 825 n.53 (2005); 
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Building a Pedagogy of Problem-Solving: Learning to 
Choose Among ADR Processes, 5 HARV.NEGOT. L. REv. 113, 129-31 (2000). 
177. See generally Richard Barnum & Thomas Grisso, Competency to Stand Trial 
in Juvenile Court in Massachusetts: Issues in TherapeuticJurisprudence,20 NEW ENG. 
J.CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 321 (1994); Ira K. Packer, The Court Clinic System in 
Massachusetts:A TherapeuticApproach vs. a Rights-OrientedApproach, 20 NEw ENG. 
J. ON CRrM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 291 (1994); Bruce J.Winick, Reforming Incompe-
tency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty, in THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE APPLIED: Es-
SAYS ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW 233, 233 n.1 (Bruce J. Winick ed. 1997). 
178. Stunningly, when one searches on WESTLAW for <"tj" "therapeutic juris-
prudence" /s forensic & DA (aft 2010)>, other than articles written by Mr. Perlin, there 
are only two substantive discussions, see infra notes 184 & 186 and accompanying text, 
by other authors. 
179. See Michael L. Perlin, "Changingof the Guards":David Wexler, Therapeu-
tic Jurisprudence,and the Transformationof Legal Scholarship, 63 INT'L J. L. & PSY-
CHIATRY 3-7 (2019). 
180. See generally Peggy Fulton Hora et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand the 
Drug Treatment Court Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Re-
sponse to Drug Abuse and Crime in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 439 (1999). 
181. See BRUCE J. WINICK & DAvID B. WEXLER, JUDGING IN A THERAPEUTIC 
KEY: THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS (2003). 
182. See PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 1, § 2-6, at 2-55 to 2-63, and nn. 323-77. 
183. See supra note 126 and accompanying text; see generally Michael L. Perlin, 
"Have You Seen Dignity?": The Story of the Development of Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, 27 U.N.Z. LAW REv. 1135 (2017). 
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within the profession."' 84 Another observes that "TJ-friendly wine1 8 5 in-
cludes forensic mental health experts to determine what treatment the minor 
would benefit the most from, effective mental health programs and institu-
tions, and rehabilitation as a genuine objective of the legal process."' 
86 
However, there are no considerations of the topics discussed in this paper. 
In a series of other papers and books, Mr. Perlin (by himself and with 
other colleagues) has identified how our systemic failures similarly violate 
TJ.187 Mr. Perlin has written in this vein about how the fundamental failures 
in the interpretation of the CRPD that would abolish the incompetency doc-
trine (and the insanity defense) grossly violate therapeutic jurisprudence 
principles.1 88 In one of those pieces, Mr. Perlin concluded: "I am convinced, 
after spending over forty years representing and working closely with per-
184. Susan Hatters Friedman, et al., How Do Evaluees Hear Testimony? Forensic 
Experts' Views, 1 INT'L J. THERAPEUTIC JuRIs. 59, 67 (2016). 
185. See David Wexler, New Wine in New Bottles: The Need to Sketch a Thera-
peutic Jurisprudence 'Code' of Proposed Criminal Processes and Practices, 7 ARIZ. 
SUMMIr L. REv. 463, 464 (2012) (explaining the wine-bottle metaphor). 
186. Melissa Cintr6n Hernindez, Mentally Ill in the Juvenile Justice System: The 
Sequential Intercept Model Approach, 2 INT'L J. THERAPEUTIC JURIs. 61, 89 (2016-
2017). 
187. For recent work, see generally PERLIN & CUCOLO, supra note 145; PERLIN, 
supranote 10; MICHAEL L. PERLIN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIG1HTS AND MENTAL Disc 
ABILITY LAW: WHEN THE SILENCED ARE HEARD (2011); MICHAEL L. PERLIN & ALISON 
J. LYNCH, SEXUALITY, DISABILITY AND THE LAW: BEYOND THE LAST FRONTIER? 
(2016); Perlin, Who Will Judge, supra note 9; Perlin, Merchants, supra note 57; 
Michael L. Perlin, "I Expected It to Happen!IKnew He'd Lost Control":The Impact of 
PTSD on Criminal Sentencing after the Promulgationof DSM-5, 4 UTAH L. REv. 881 
(2015); Michael L. Perlin, There's a Dyin' Voice Within Me Reaching out Somewhere: 
How TherapeuticJurisprudenceCan Bring Voice to the Teaching of Mental Disability 
and Criminal Law, 3 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 37 (2015); Michael L. Perlin, "The Ladder of 
the Law Has No Top and No Bottom": How Therapeutic JurisprudenceCan Give Life 
to InternationalHuman Rights, 37 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 535 (2014); Perlin, supra 
note 4; Michael L. Perlin & Heather Ellis Cucolo, "Tolling for the Aching Ones Whose 
Wounds CannotBe Nursed": The Marginalizationof Racial Minoritiesand Women in 
Institutional Mental Disability Law, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 431 (2017); 
Michael L. Perlin & Alison J. Lynch, "She's Nobody's Child/The Law Can'tTouch Her 
at All": Seeking to Bring Dignity to Legal ProceedingsInvolving Juveniles, 56 FAM. 
CT. REV. 79 (2018); Lynch & Perlin, supra note 5; Naomi M. Weinstein & Michael L. 
Perlin, "Who's Pretending to Care for Him?" How the Endless Jail-to-Hospital-to-
Street-Repeat Cycle Deprives Persons with Mental Disabilitiesthe Right to Continuity 
of Care, 8 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 455 (2018); Perlin, Harmon & Chatt, supra 
note 10. 
188. See generally Perlin, supra note 70.; Perlin & Szeli, Evolution, supra note 
70; Perlin & Szeli, Challenges, supra note 70. 
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sons with serious mental disabilities in the criminal-justice system, that 
[embracing therapeutic jurisprudence] is the only way that we can begin to 
eradicate the poison of sanism that contaminates our criminal-justice 
system."8'9 
The authors adhere to that conclusion today. Beyond this, we believe 
that in the context of social benefits law, it is necessary for lawyers repre-
senting persons with disabilities to embrace therapeutic jurisprudence prin-
ciples in an effort to advance "healing and wellness," 190 and to structure 
arguments that are consonant with-and not dissonant with-a social 
model of disability. 
We also must consider the near-global ineffectiveness of counsel in 
cases involving persons with mental disabilities from the perspective of 
therapeutic jurisprudence. 19' Recently, Mr. Perlin asked-quasi-rhetori-
cally-"to what extent do the ample bodies of case law construing the inef-
fectiveness assistance of counsel standard established by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Strickland v. Washington 92 even consider the implications of TJ 
lawyering?"'193 To be blunt, with the exception of the now mostly-overruled 
Montana case of In re MentalHealth of K.G.F.,194 the answer is, sadly, "not 
at all." Until courts begin to consider these issues through a therapeutic 
jurisprudence filter, it is unlikely there will be any significant ameliorative 
change. It is important to recognize that the practice of TJ should not, and 
cannot, stop with lawyers. It is essential that other members of the legal 
system, including judges, case workers, and judicial staff, be sensitive to the 
needs of persons with disabilities, 195 and that they are sensitized to the pop-
189. Perlin, supra note 70, at 518. Elsewhere, Mr. Perlin has asked: "If a defen-
dant is, in fact, incompetent to stand trial, that means that he does not have 'sufficient 
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational under-
standing and[/]or a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against 
him;' how can TJ principles be invoked in such a case?" Perlin, supra note 64, at 516-
17. 
190. Winick, supra note 164, at 26. 
191. See generally Perlin, Who Will Judge, supra note 9. 
192. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (asking "whether coun-
sel's conduct so undermined the proper function of the adversarial process that the trial 
court cannot be relied on as having produced a just result"). See generally PERLIN & 
CUCOLO, supra note 1, ch. 6. 
193. Perlin & Lynch, Mr. Bad Example, supra note 9, at 319. On the application 
of TJ principles to cases relying on Strickland,see Perlin et al., supra note 10, at 81-88. 
194. K.G. F., 29 P.3d 485 (Mont. 2001). But see In re J.S., 401 P.3d 197 (Mont. 
2017) (partially overruling K.G.F.); see generallyPERLIN & CucoLo, supra note 1, § 6-
3.3.4, at 640 to 641 (3d ed. 2018). 
195. See, e.g., Leslie Larkin Cooney, Giving Millennialsa Leg-Up: How to Avoid 
the "IfI Knew Then What I Know Now" Syndrome, 96 Ky. L.J. 505, 513 (2007-2008) 
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ulation's diverse needs. This will help prevent dismissive and sanist 
attitudes. 
Finally, Mr. Perlin has suggested often in the past that the use of thera-
peutic jurisprudence-to strip bare the law's sanist fagade-will become a 
powerful tool that will serve as "a means of attacking and uprooting 'the 
we/they distinction that has traditionally plagued and stigmatized the men-
tally disabled'-then that result will be therapeutic: for the legal system, for 
the development of mental disability law, and ultimately, for all of us."'
1 96 
We similarly adhere to that conclusion today. 
197 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have sought to bring some measure of coherence to 
our discussion of the combined complexities of the law and disability sys-
tems, and why navigation of those systems is sometimes so frustrating and 
difficult. As we noted earlier, Mr. Perlin was truly surprised when he 
learned that no one had yet tackled this important problem. Our hope is that 
this paper encourages others-scholars and practitioners alike-to take 
these issues seriously. 
Many of us, to return to the couplet that gave us the title for this paper, 
"feel to moan" when faced with the reality of how persons with disabilities 
are treated in the legal system. We hope that, in place of the "waterfalls of 
pity" that Dylan writes about in the same couplet, we rise to the challenge 
on behalf of these populations. For, in the most often-cited lyric in the song 
in question, "He not busy being born is busy dying." 198 
("The tenets of TJ espouse a multi-disciplinary approach to law."); Selwyn Fraser, A 
Cloak of Many Philosophies:RestorativeJustice, TherapeuticJurisprudence,andFam-
ily Empowerment in Aotearoa New Zealand's Youth Justice System, 2 INT'L J. THERA-
PEUTIC Jurs. 157, 164 (2017) ("The TJ research programme is multi-disciplinary, 
outcome-oriented, and grounded in empirical research (especially drawing from the 
behavioural sciences)."). 
196. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 
301 (2000). 
197. See Michael L. Perlin, "Your CorruptWays Had FinallyMade You Blind": 
ProsecutorialMisconduct and the Use of "Ethnic Adjustments" in Death PenaltyCases 
ofDefendants with IntellectualDisabilities,65 AM. U. L. REV. 1437, 1455 n.95 (2016). 
198. Dylan, supra note 18. 

